The Afghan Way of War by Rob Johnson

Author:Rob Johnson
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2011-02-26T16:00:00+00:00

Operations on the Khyber Front

At Bagh in the Khyber Pass, the Afghans occupied unexpectedly a 2,000-yard long crest, the Ash Khel, and brought up more reinforcements including artillery. However, the Afghan commander, Mohammed Anwar Khan, failed to capitalize on his initial advantage in numbers so that, within two days, the British could muster five battalions, machine guns and a battery of mountain artillery to support the nearby garrison of Landi Kotal. Aware that the British would now take offensive action, the Afghans established two belts of defences. An outpost line was thrown forward to the base of the ridge, while the main position on the crest line, a natural amphitheatre, was entrenched. Although keen to take the offensive as soon as possible, the British commander, General Crocker, was concerned that his northern flank was exposed and there was every possibility that Mohmand and Afridi irregulars would appear in large numbers from this direction. Covering this northern flank meant reducing the numbers available for the attack against the Afghan regulars. Consequently, even though the outpost line was driven back, the British and Indian troops could not get through the weight of fire from the main position. At nightfall, the British dug in on the lower slopes.19 The Afghans believed the First Battle of Bagh was a victory, but they failed to make any counter-attack and contented themselves with harassing gunfire.

The failure to exploit the situation, coupled with the failure of the Peshawar uprising, neutralized the momentum that might have encouraged the clans on the British side of the border to join the war. The British had prevented the Afghans taking control of the Khyber Pass because of the rapid arrival of British reinforcements by motor transport vehicles and through air attacks, and it is likely that the Afghan strategy depended on the ability to open the road to Peshawar. The British also noted that the Afghans made other elementary mistakes in mountain warfare. They did not, for example, occupy some vital picquet positions through the night and so the British were able to seize a key feature known as Bright’s Hill at dawn on 9 May 1919 without opposition.

The Afghans did bring forward more reinforcements, but they were unable to cope with the speed by which the British could mount operations. Despite being checked at Bagh on 9 May, the British were in a position to make a second assault just two days later.20 This time the attack was made with six infantry battalions, twenty-two machine guns and eighteen artillery pieces and was initiated at night to maintain security. The leading units were within yards of the Afghan positions when firing broke out. The British made their attacks by hurling grenades into Afghan sangars, and then followed up with bayonet charges and close-range fire support. Bagh was overrun and five Afghan guns captured, and as they withdrew they were strafed by British aircraft or shot down by carefully placed cut-off groups. It was estimated that in the Second Battle of Bagh

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.